B
ecause both biological phenomena and the measurements researchers make in studying them are often quite variable, methods of statistical analysis have much to offer science. Statistical analysis has many aspects, including describing distributions of data, exploring the fit of data to various models, estimating and determining confidence intervals for parameters such as means and variances, and helping to identify real effects in the face of random variation (separating signal from noise). Significance tests, a tool for the latter purpose, are the focus of this article. Sometimes it seems that many biologists view significance testing as the overriding purpose of statistics, although many statisticians (Chatfield 1985) lament the overemphasis on that aspect of their trade at the expense of other aspects.
To view significance tests at their most useful, consider the following scenario: An inebriated guest at a party claims the ability to influence the outcome of coin flips. Upon your challenge for evidence, he suggests that you and he go to separate rooms, with each of you accompanied by a witness of your choosing. You are to wait 5 minutes while he writes down a sequence of 10 "H" and "T" letters and then flip a coin (supplied by you) 10 times and record the outcomes. During the wait, you decide you will analyze the results with a significance test, with the null hypothesis being that he is fundamentally no better than a 50:50 guesser, and the one-tailed alternative being that he really has at least some ability to match more than 50% of coin tosses in this way.
Suppose the sequence he writes is HTTHTTTTHT, and your flips turn out as HTHHTTTTHT, so that 9 of the 10 match. From the binomial distribution, the probability of his matching 9 or 10 tosses correctly out of 10, if he were really only a 50% guesser, is just under 0.011. If you had decided to use the conventional α = 0.05 (i.e., a 5% probability of rejecting the null hypothesis if it were really true), then you would have to reject the null hypothesis and consider the result to be evidence for the fellow's claim. However, if you had been really skeptical of the claim, and if having to believe him would be costly (to your peace of mind, perhaps), then you might have chosen to require a smaller α (0.01 or even smaller); then you would not have had to reject the null hypothesis.
The point of this example is that significance tests make some sense in situations for which there is good reason, if only Ockham's razor (Jeffreys and Berger 1992) , to believe a null hypothesis, and we wish to place a strong burden of proof on those who would attempt to refute that hypothesis. Many scientific investigations are not of this form, however, so significance testing is often not the most appropriate way to David F. Parkhurst (e-mail: parkhurs@indiana.edu EQUIVALENCE TESTS IMPROVE THE LOGIC   OF SIGNIFICANCE TESTING WHEN DEMON-STRATING SIMILARITY IS IMPORTANT, AND   REVERSE TESTS CAN HELP SHOW THAT   FAILURE TO REJECT A NULL HYPOTHESIS   DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT HYPOTHESIS analyze data. For example, it often makes more sense to estimate how large some effect is, rather than simply to determine whether the effect occurs (Tukey 1991) .
When significance tests are used and a null hypothesis is not rejected, a major problem often arises -namely, the result may be interpreted, without a logical basis, as providing evidence for the null hypothesis. This illogical misinterpretation can be a problem for two distinct reasons:
1. Especially in many applied situations, the most relevant question may be whether the responses of some result Y to treatments X1 and X2 are similar enough for practical purposes, rather than whether the responses to the two treatments are different. Yet significance tests of the common form with no-effect null hypotheses address the second type of question, not the first, and failure to reject a no-effect null hypothesis does not provide evidence that the two treatments are "similar enough" in their effects on Y.
2. As illustrated by the coin example, traditional significance testing has the effect of placing a burden of proof on those who wish to claim that a factor X does influence a response Y. If we assume that the goal of basic science is to work toward determining what is true, then it seems we should require equally strong proof from those who would state that factor X does not affect response Y. However, biologists and other scientists commonly report results that are not "statistically significant," using statements like "X did not affect Y" without providing evidence for the lack of an effect. Audiences or readers then seem prone to accept such statements without asking for evidence that X really did not affect Y.
A large and growing literature describes numerous other problems with significance testing. Hunter and Schmidt (1997) and Anderson and colleagues (2000) provide good leads into that literature. Useful replacements exist, including emphasis on estimates and associated indicators of precision such as confidence limits (Gardner and Altman 1986, Poole 2001) , Bayesian analysis (Box and Tiao 1973 , Jeffreys and Berger 1992 , Ellison 1996 , likelihood analysis (Royall 1997) , and methods based on information theory (Anderson et al. 2000) . This article focuses on the two particular problems just described.
Applied science: Two examples of "accepting the null hypothesis" Example A1. (This example is based loosely on a real occurrence from 1999.) Researchers interested in controlling insect species V, a vector for a disease that infects various mammals, including humans, perform a pilot study to test whether spraying a certain fungus in forests will reduce the numbers of the vector species. Potential changes in populations of nontarget species that might be caused by the fungus are also of concern, and this example focuses on those effects.
The researchers lay out 30 blocks at random locations in some forested land and spray the fungus on half of each block. One week later, 20 soil cores are collected from each half block, and the numbers of mites (one of the nontarget taxa of interest) extracted from the combined (composited) soil from each half block are counted. With the use of conventional significance testing, the researchers then perform a paired t test for the no-effect null hypothesis H 0 (no difference in population mean numbers of mites between the sprayed and unsprayed areas) versus H a (fewer or more mites on average in sprayed areas). Suppose that the data appeared to be roughly log-normal in distribution and were log transformed to provide a test of the ratio of mite numbers in the treated area to numbers in the control area.
Suppose next that about 7% fewer mites were collected on average from the sprayed subplots, but, because of the variability in the paired differences, this result was "not statistically significant" at α = 0.05 (P = 0.22, say). It might then be argued by some scientists or decisionmakers that "the fungus had no effect on the mites," and that result might mistakenly be taken as an indication of the safety of the fungus to those organisms. However, failure to reject a null hypothesis of no difference does not justify such an interpretation, for as Sagan (1995, p. 213) has noted,"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence [of some phenomenon]."
If protection of mites and other nontarget taxa is considered important in a situation like this (as I believe it should be), then the question that should be emphasized is "Do we have evidence that the fungus is safe for the mites?" rather than the much weaker "Do we lack evidence that the fungus is not safe for the mites?" This distinction is important because of the ways that significance tests, with the sample sizes and degrees of variability that often apply in biological studies, make rejection of null hypotheses generally difficult and failure to reject null hypotheses relatively easy. The equivalence tests to be described below allow asking directly for evidence of safety, and they remove the need to treat lack of evidence for undesirable effects illogically as evidence for safety. As McBride (1999) has suggested, reversing the burden of proof in this way is consistent with the "precautionary principle."
Example A2. More generally, "safe" levels for toxic chemicals are often set by determining so-called lowest-observedeffect levels (LOELs) and no-observed-effect levels (NOELs). However, LOELs are not determined by direct observation, but rather as "the lowest toxicant [level] in which the values of the measured response are statistically significantly different from those in the control" (Greenberg et al. 1992, p. 8-2) . The NOEL is then the next lowest toxicant level, at which no statistically significant response had been observed. This does not mean that the toxicant had no important biological effect at that level, but only that a different response from the control had not been "proven beyond reasonable doubt," so to speak. Stephan and Rogers (1985) and Suter (1996) , among others, have argued against this biased way of choosing levels to ensure safety, but the method is still commonly used.
The equivalence tests described later can help to improve the contribution of statistics in applied situations like these by allowing questions about similarity (and relative safety) to be addressed directly rather than in a backhanded way.
Basic science: Three examples of "accepting the null hypothesis"
Example B1. I have twice reviewed papers in which authors argued in essence that because the mean of some group X 1 was not "significantly" different from the mean of a group X 2 , the factor X could have no effect on some response Y (Parkhurst 1985) . As a result, in both cases the authors proposed to neglect factor X and to study only the effects of other factors on Y. It is clear that significance testing causes some scientists to misunderstand their data and to learn wrong things from those data. Surely this misunderstanding slows scientific progress (Schmidt 1996) . This attitude may also lead authors not to submit, or reviewers to reject, papers on results that are not "statistically significant" (Csada et al. 1996 , Bauchau 1997 .
Example B2. As noted previously, failure to find statistical significance for "X affects Y" is often reported in talks and papers with an assertion that X does not affect Y. For example, Hobbs (1988) reported that "structurally heterogeneous patches are not more species rich than their homogeneous counterparts" (p. 149; emphasis added). However, the data provided there suggested otherwise. The mean species richness in 10 heterogeneous patches varied from 13% to 37% higher than that in the 20 homogeneous patches studied, depending on whether the data were combined overall, divided into native versus alien classes, or divided by growth form (trees, shrubs, or herbs). The ratio was 1.20 for all species combined. The P values for the six comparisons ranged from about 0.19 to 0.39. Thus, while it may be true that the data do not provide "evidence beyond reasonable doubt" (at α = 5% or even 10%) that species richness differed between the two treatments, there is certainly no convincing evidence that it did not so differ. In the interests of truth in science, authors should avoid claiming lack of effects unless they perform equivalence or reverse tests like those to be described later.
Example B3. I have read many papers with similar claims of "no effect," and I have often heard such claims in talks, including talks at every meeting of the Ecological Society of America that I have attended in the past 20 years. At times I have asked speakers, in private conversations after their talks, why they had asserted "no effect" when a hypothesized effect (or occasionally its opposite) seemed to be indicated in a table or plot of the data. I have received two types of answers: Some have replied,"Well, you know what I mean. What I said was just shorthand for 'no statistically significant effect.'" Others have answered thus: "Well, it wasn't statistically significant, so whatever effect I saw must have resulted only from random variation," implying that they had concluded that their null hypotheses were true at the population level.
With the first of these replies, not every listener or reader of a paper, including journalists who may report on the researcher's work and decisionmakers who may make use of the reported work, will understand the difference between what was said and what was meant. I suggest that "truth in science" requires us not to use code words with hidden, jargonistic meanings.
The second way of thinking is the (il)logical equivalent of failing to find a pair of pliers in a quick search of a messy garage and claiming that failure to be good evidence that the pliers were not there. This interpretation may be even more problematic than the first, suggesting as it does that the scientist believed that lack of a statistically significant result should be treated as positive evidence for lack of an effect at the population level. In more than 20 years of teaching graduate statistics, I have had numerous students who have said they had been taught to interpret lack of statistical significance in that way. Clearly, if some listeners or readers take "no effect" statements literally, then others who use such statements as shorthand will at times be misunderstood. Hunter and Schmidt (1997) indicate that many psychologists share this kind of misinterpretation.
Between these two types of response lies a third form of confusion, that is, the notion that if an effect is not "significant" then it is not important. As a related point, over the years I have reviewed numerous ecological papers in which both very different meanings of the word "significant"-statistically detectable versus substantially important-were used in the same paper. Very often when that is the case, there is no indication that the authors had been clear in their own minds which meaning they were implying at any given time, and, even if they had been, the two different meanings would most likely confuse readers.
Some textbooks do a good job of describing the correct logic associated with nonrejection, but others do not. For example, Samuels (1989, p. 209) wrote, "In other words, nonrejection of H 0 is not the same as acceptance of H 0 .... Nonrejection of H 0 indicates that the data are compatible with H 0 , but the data may also be quite compatible with H A ." The reverse tests described in the next section serve to demonstrate to both the producers and the users of data that failing to demonstrate some effect statistically is not equivalent to demonstrating that the effect does not occur.
Equivalence and reverse tests, and how they can help
In this section, I describe a method for looking at data statistically but with different null and alternative hypotheses from the no-effect null hypotheses that have been used most often to date. In many situations in which data are obtained to help decisionmakers choose among various actions, it will be useful to have tests to determine whether a difference between two or more treatments is small enough to allow the treatments to be considered equivalent in a practical sense. Such tests, which pharmacologists have used extensively to help determine whether two drug formulations have similar enough physiological and therapeutic effects, are often termed bioequivalence or, more generally, equivalence tests.
These tests can also be used (especially in basic science) in a second way, for which I use the term reverse tests. In this form of use, they are applied after a no-effect hypothesis test has failed to yield a "significant" result. Then, the reverse test can help in determining whether the original result could reasonably be interpreted as demonstrating lack of an important response, or whether it should more accurately be taken as evidence for lack of certainty caused by some combination of high variability and inadequate sample size.
Mechanics of equivalence and reverse tests
This section provides examples of equivalence tests and reverse tests. Equivalence tests are appropriate when demonstrating similarity rather than differences in responses is desirable, and reverse tests can help in deciding whether data that fail to provide statistical evidence for a difference can be used to infer lack of any important practical difference.
Equivalence test example. An equivalence test for the situation described in example A1 might look like this: Suppose that the total number of mites extracted from the 600 soil cores from the sprayed subplots was 6.6% lower than the total number extracted from the control subplots. Suppose further that various parties involved in a decision of whether to spray the fungus in certain public forest reserves agree that a true change in mite numbers of less than ±10% would be acceptable-that is, population sizes that differ by no more than 10% of the control population would be considered as practically equivalent. A relevant equivalence test could then work with the hypotheses (cf. Berger and Hsu 1996, p. 284): where µ f is the population mean number of mites that would be found per subplot sprayed with fungus, and µ c is the equivalent population mean for control subplots. In words, the null hypothesis states that mite numbers differ too much (in one direction or the other) between the two treatments to be considered practically equivalent, whereas the alternative states that the ratio is "near enough" to 1:1. This set of hypotheses has the usual property in significance testing that H 0 must be rejected to "establish" the alternative (practical equivalence here) statistically.
If the 30 plot-wise sample ratios x fi / x ci (total mite count from the sprayed half of plot i divided by total mite count from the control half) appeared to be approximately log-normally distributed, then it would be appropriate to log transform those ratios. We could then test the modified hypotheses:
Several tests have been devised to deal with this type of composite null hypothesis, and all involve some compromise between being scientifically logical versus being mathematically exact in the sense of having a Type I error rate precisely equal to the chosen α (Perlman and Wu 1999) . Here I will use the two one-sided tests (TOSTs) first proposed by Schuirmann (1981) and in a different form by Westlake (1981) . In this analysis, both of the component hypotheses in equation 2 must be false to reject H 0 in favor of H a , that is, to conclude that the true ratio is likely to be within the specified range.
To perform that test, let lr (log of ratio) be the mean of the logs of the 30 x fi / x ci sample ratios, and s-lr be the standard error of those logs. For our data, suppose that lr = -0.0748 and thats lr = 0.0596. Then, following Berger and Hsu (1996) , in the TOST each part of H 0 is subjected to an ordinary t test, with Those statistics are compared with t a,v , the value that cuts off a fraction α in the Student's t distribution with v degrees of freedom. In the present case, we use the conventional α = 0.05 and v = 30 -1 = 29, so t a,v .= 1.699. In particular, the null hypothesis on the left in equation 2 would be rejected only if T L > t a,v . and the null hypothesis on the right would be rejected only if T U < -t a,v . Here the hypothesis on the right can be rejected (P = 0.031), but the one on the left cannot (P = 0.290). Thus, we have insufficient evidence for practical equivalence; that is, we cannot conclude that the true difference in mite numbers between the sprayed and control plots is within ±10 of the average control number.
If there were a prior agreement that the fungus must be demonstrated statistically to be safe (in the sense of causing a change in mite numbers of less than ±10), then these data do not support a decision to spray. The choice not to spray is the opposite of the spraying that might have been chosen, had lack of statistical evidence of harm been wrongly interpreted as positive evidence of safety. (Some might argue that the decision should be based on the estimate of a 6.6% reduction in mite numbers, which does fall in the safety zone, but such a decision rule would neglect the uncertainty associated with that estimate. However, if significance testing is to be part of the decisionmaking process, then this equivalence test is the logical one to use here to promote environmental safety.)
Other tests with somewhat different properties exist for this type of situation (Berger and Hsu 1996) , but see McBride (1999), Perlman and Wu (1999) , and the discussion following the Berger and Hsu (1996) paper for comments on some problems with those tests.
Reverse test example for a one-tailed t test. Equivalence tests are most useful when the fundamental research goal is to search for evidence that two or more treatments have effects that are "alike enough" to fulfill some practical purpose. Tests with a similar logic can also be used in a second context, namely, reverse testing. Reverse tests provide a useful follow-up analysis when (1) a no-effect null hypothesis has been tested but could not be rejected, and (2) the analyst then wants to check whether the same data support a con-clusion that the original null hypothesis is "nearly enough" correct.
Suppose, for example, that we have (hypothetical) data relating chlorophyll concentrations (C chl ) to phosphorus concentrations (C P ) in a group of lakes, as shown in Figure 1 . One interesting result of this analysis is the slope estimate, which indicates the increase in C chl to be expected from a unit increase in C P . Some scientists might consider it desirable to perform a test to determine whether (and they might unfortunately think "or not") the estimated increase was real. A one-tailed t test for H 0 : β = 0 versus H 1 : β > 0 yields the P value of 0.14 shown in the figure, so the result is "not statistically significant" at the conventional α = 5% level.
This result corresponds with t = (b-0) / s b = 0.1805 / 0.1438 = 1.255, where b and s b are the slope estimate and its standard error derived from the data. The slope estimate b = β is shown in Figure 2a , in relation to the critical rejection region for the test. Even though phosphorus is often the nutrient that most limits algal growth and hence chlorophyll concentrations in freshwater lakes, scientists who overemphasize or misinterpret significance tests might take this result to indicate that phosphorus had "no effect" on chlorophyll in these particular lakes. Of course, a measured slope of b = 0.1805 would be more likely to occur if the true slope were ≈ 0.1805 than if β were zero, and, for that matter, the measured slope would be just as likely to occur if β = 2b = 0.361 as it would if β = 0. Thus, it is hard to understand why "no effect" is so often assumed when a test fails to yield statistical significance.
Although statisticians know that failure to reject a null hypothesis does not prove that hypothesis to be true, this concept is difficult to get across to students and to some practicing scientists. Each year in my graduate statistics course, for example, I have had many students who failed to appreciate this distinction, despite having previously taken an undergraduate statistics course. Many scientists appear not to understand the difference either. So how can we, as biologists and teachers, educate users of significance tests to interpret them more rationally in cases in which the null hypothesis is not rejected?
I propose that, whenever a null hypothesis is not rejected, a reverse test be carried out (if one can be devised to fit the situation) to investigate whether the data provide evidence for the effect in question being negligible. (It may be wiser to replace testing entirely with Bayesian or other approaches, but, because significance testing is so deeply ingrained in some fields, reverse tests should serve as useful stopgaps [Poole 2001 ] until more rational approaches become common). For the present example, we would first need to choose a cutoff value below which we would consider β (the increase in chlorophyll corresponding to a unit increase in C P ) to be negligible. This cutoff value would be an example of a minimum important effect size, or MIES. Choosing MIES is similar to choosing an effect size for sample size or power calculations (Cohen 1988 ), but it has a different purpose.
The limnologists who provided the data might tell us that they would consider a β value of 0.25 mg chlorophyll (mg phosphorus) -1 or less to be negligible. (Such a choice must be based on knowledge of the subject matter; it cannot be determined by some automatic statistical process.) Thus, we could define a new set of hypotheses to test: 
versus (note the less-than sign). Only if we can reject this new null hypothesis in favor of its alternative do our data provide evidence that the slope is negligible in a practical sense. Such tests are similar in method, but different in intent, to the equivalence tests described earlier.
To perform this new test, we calculate t = (b -MIES) / s b = (0.1805 -0.25) / 0.1438 = -1.081, for which P = 0.17 (Figure 2b) . This calculation shows that, just as our data do not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate at α = 0.05 that β is greater than zero, the data just as surely fail to establish that β is negligible. In numerous tests I have looked at in this way, data are usually inconclusive in both directions, as occurred here. This particular type of reverse test is straightforward for any situation leading to a one-tailed t test.
Minimum detectable negligible effects. There may be situations, especially in basic science, in which not enough is known to define a MIES or, in applied science, in which different users of the information may have different opinions about what the MIES should be. In such cases, an alternative approach is to determine the minimum detectable negligible effect (MDNE) , that is, a hypothetical value of the MIES at which the data would just allow rejection of the reverse null hypothesis:
As indicated by Figure 2c , this is the value for which where b and s b are the slope estimate and its standard error derived from the data. In the present case, T = -2.132 for α = 5% (4 df), so the MDNE is 0.487. This calculation turns out to yield a value identical to the upper 90% (i.e., 1 -2α), twosided confidence limit for β and could therefore be easily and automatically computed by most statistical software. In at least some situations, it is likely that the MDNE would lead all parties to agree that the value in question either is, or is not, negligible.
One reviewer suggested that confidence intervals should replace significance testing entirely, but then gave an example that used such an interval to make a yes-or-no decision that exactly paralleled the significance tests performed above (cf. Poole 2001) . I believe that reverse tests will be better understood by the target audience for the ideas presented here, namely, scientists who believe that significance tests are useful tools for interpreting data.
Equivalence and reverse tests of other types. The mite-fungus example described above involved a situation in which analysts unfamiliar with equivalence tests would likely have tested a conventional no-effect null hypothesis with a test based on the Student t distribution. The reverse test just illustrated was also based on the t distribution, as was the original no-effect test that preceded it. Of course, not all significance tests are based on this distribution, so other kinds of reverse and equivalence tests need to be devised. Analysis of variance is particularly common in some fields of biology, and reverse tests to accompany analysis of variance are under development (Parkhurst 1998) . When null hypotheses are not rejected in significance tests for which no reverse test is known, it is still useful to keep the concept in mind as a reminder that failure to reject a null hypothesis should not be treated as evidence for that hypothesis.
Relationship to power analysis
Some readers may notice a relationship between the ideas described here and the concept of power of a statistical test-that is, the probability that the null hypothesis would be rejected if that hypothesis were wrong by a certain amount. Estimates of power are especially useful in the research planning stage, when they can be used to predict what sample sizes will be needed to provide a given degree of power in the analyses planned for the data one expects to obtain. However, consider a situation in which a no-effect null hypothesis has not been rejected. In such a situation, a reverse test to check whether the data provide evidence that "whatever effect is there is smaller than some minimum important effect size" seems fairly easy to interpret. In my experience, it has seemed less useful in such circumstances to estimate how often the null hypothesis would be rejected if the true effect size were equal to that MIES and if the experiment could be repeated many times. Post hoc power analysis has also been questioned by others (e.g., Hoenig and Heisey 2001 and references therein).
Conclusions
In my own experience, in spite of my teaching about interpretation of significance tests in statistics classes, on final examinations students frequently expressed the belief that failing to reject a null hypothesis meant that the hypothesis was true. Since I have begun teaching reverse tests, the proportion of students making this error has declined dramatically.
In December 1996, a task force for the American Psychological Association (APA) met to consider, among other issues, whether statistical significance tests should be banned from APA journals (Azar 1997) . The group did not ultimately recommend such a ban, but formation of that task force indicates the existence of serious problems with some of the ways significance testing is commonly used in science. This article has concentrated on two related subsets of those problems and suggested some methods, unfamiliar to many biologists, for reducing the occurrence of those problems. Specifically, when the logic of a situation calls for demonstration of similarity rather than differences among responses to various treatments, then equivalence tests are often more relevant than tests with traditional no-effect null hypotheses Hauck 1986, Dixon 1998 ). In other situations for which the traditional test is thought to be useful, but in which the null hypothesis is not rejected, reverse tests can be used to help sort out whether any effect that may exist is really close to negligible or whether (as is often the case) the results must simply be treated as inconclusive. 
. The crux of the problem appears to be that users of hypothesis tests often seem to believe, and perhaps to wish, that the tests can distinguish between "the null hypothesis is true"and "the alternative hypothesis is true. "The methods outlined here help to make clear that tests can at most distinguish between "the null hypothesis seems likely to be false" and "given our data, we cannot tell which hypothesis is correct." For statistical methods to aid in scientific progress, they must be interpreted correctly.
We biologists have conflicting goals when interpreting data: We should avoid the all-too-human tendency to see what we are looking for and to miss seeing what we are not expecting. At the same time, we should not be misled into thinking that a statistical hypothesis test can show that either the null hypothesis is false and the alternative true, or vice versa. In fact, significance tests can at best provide evidence against the null hypothesis, but never for it (unless it is known that power is sufficiently high). Significance testing is popular because it can help prevent treating data that may represent random variation around occurrences expected if the null hypothesis is true as evidence for the alternative. It is time to adopt further procedures, like equivalence and reverse tests, to prevent the equally undesirable action of treating a no-effect null hypothesis as true, simply because it could not be rejected. We need to be more willing to acknowledge that a study has been inconclusive.
